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BOOK REVIEWS
Leviathan and Natural Law. By F. Lyman Windolph. Princeton: The
Princeton University Press, 1951. Pp. ix, 147. $2.50.
The principal propositions upon which Mr. Windolph erects the
structure of his thought appear to the reviewer to be these: In every
political society some person or group has absolute, unlimited power.
This person or group is the sovereign. The aggregate of sovereign
and subjects is the state. The sovereign creates the government. Politically speaking, only those rights which originate with the sovereign
and are effective against the government are liberties. States may be
classified according to whether sovereign power is held by one, a few,
or many. Essential to a democratic sovereignty is like-mindedness on
fundamentals; mere majority rule will not work in the absence of such
like-mindedness. Law is, with rare exceptions, a body of rules and
determinations originating with the government, as distinguished from
the sovereign. Morality, or right, or reason, which constitute natural
law, are not ingredients of sovereignty or law, but are a basis on which
sovereignty and law are judged.
This reconciliation of the idea of the state and its absolute sovereign
with the existence of natural right and justice suggests the title of the
book, "Leviathan and Natural Law." Leviathan is, of course, the state;
the metaphor is borrowed from Hobbes.
This little book deserves highest praise. Its shortcomings, and they
may be shortcomings only to the reviewer, arise from the author's too
rigid adherence to his thought structure or mental house of cards above
briefly sketched. 'For example, his concept of sovereignty, a principal
element in that thought structure, seems of dubious validity to begin
with, and leads the author to some even more dubious concjusions. The
first chapter is devoted to proving that in every state there is in some
person or group absolute and unlimited power. The kernel of the chapter is in the words, "If you live in a political society at all, some man
or group can confiscate your property and forfeit your life." The
author refutes the view that "the precise merit of a democracy is that
the citizen is protected from the exercise of arbitrary power." This
view he disposes of by pointing out that although, if the President of the
United States were to proceed by arbitrary fiat against the lives or
property of his political opponents, his act would be declared void by
the Supreme Court, still if the constitution were amended to authorize
him so to proceed, then he could condemn his opponents to death, and
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they could look nowhere for protection. Sovereign power, therefore,
could be exercised in amending the constitution. This is artificial reasoning, divorced from reality. Power and will cannot in the actual life
of a people be disentangled from the history, convictions, and character
of the people, which make their will what it is. Only in theory could
anything like such an amendment of the constitution take place in the
United States now. The day may come when such an amendment would
be possible, but if so the explanation will be found in a change in American life, not in the existence all the while of despotic power somewhere.
The author applies his theory to reach a bad result when he refutes
the bitter statement of a returned soldier that he had given one of his
legs but that the diplomats would not give up any of their sovereignty.
Windolph answers that if sovereignty is a fact the soldier is in no better
position than if he had said that he had given a leg but the scientists
would not give up any of their law of gravity. It is the reviewer's view
that the soldier spoke a truth of critical importance in a manner such
that the truth he spoke was well understood, even though the expression
did not fit in with Windolph's scheme of though. Perhaps the soldier's
utterance would have fitted that scheme of thought if the soldier had
said, "I gave my leg, but the diplomats are unwilling to take any steps
looking toward the support by their sovereigns of a world organization
capable of preserving peace." But was not the same truth visible in
what the soldier did say?
Equally unsatisfactory to the reviewer is Mr. Windolph's discussion
of proposed world government. He holds that nearly all the proposals
for a world federation are founded on one or the other of two conflicting
assumptions, either that it is possible to form a state in which irresistable power is located in several places at once, or a state in which
such power is nowhere to be found. The proposal therefore does not
fit Mr. Windolph's scheme of thought any better than did the utterance
of the soldier who had lost his leg but not his vision. The reviewer
believes that the world government proposal fits realities better than it
does theories. Granted persuasion and conviction, there is nothing to
.prevent constitutional amendments, in countries governed under constitutions, enabling each such country to participate in a world government.
In the absence of a constitution the "sovereign," whoever 'is such by
Mr. Windolph's definition, could do, or assent to doing, likewise. Perhaps at some future date a war like the American Civil War would have
to be fought to determine where supreme and unquestionable power
actually would reside-but perhaps not. At any rate theoretical future
wars do not contain the same deadly menace to our survival that actual
and presently threatened wars do in the existing condition of interna-
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tional anarchy. Mr. Windolph also points to lack of like-mindedness
among the peoples of the world on fundamentals as an obstacle to world
government. The reviewer would point to unity on the one necessary
fundamental-the desire for peace. The world government should, in
the beginning, be limited to the function of keeping the peace. After all,
systems of law, in primitive times, originated for that purpose.
To criticise Windolph for too rigid an adherence to his own scheme
of thought is by no means to condemn his book. Such a criticism can
be made of even the giants of jurisprudence, such as Austin, Bentham,
Savigny, and others. Law and politics have to do with life; life is
infinitely varied; and the varied truth about it cannot all be corralled
in one point of view or scheme of thought. Granted inevitable limitations on the author's thought structure, the question remains how well
he has written; with what insight, wisdom, and skill he has filled in the
outline he has contrived. Windolph's book as a whole is superb. Some
of the first pages of the book, in which the author is concerned largely
with his concepts, particularly his concept of sovereignty, might discourage many readers. But these pages make up, so far as the reviewer
is concerned, a sort of fence which must be climbed in order to get into
the author's watermelon patch. The patch is worth the climb. For one
thing Mr. Windolph is what many authors in the field of jurisprudence
are not, namely a first rate writer. Good ideas badly presented are
almost characteristic of juristic writing. Windolph is not only a thinker,
he knows how to find words to express his thoughts with remarkable
nicety and clarity. As is the case with other first rate writers, his search
for brevity and clarity in expressing a large scale idea occasionally
results in a gem such as this one, ". . . where there is no will to obey
there can be no liberty in obedience."
The author is obviously widely read, but that is not all. Where less
skillful writers insert in their work chunks taken from others, Windolph
weaves into his thought the thought of men of other ages to make a
smoothly blended whole. In so doing he leaves an impression of the
timelessness of ideas. The author not only has a strong sense of history,
he wants to create in his readers the same vivid feel for history he
himself has. Thus to make alive his point that the great pageant of
American history has been condensed into a brief period of time he
writes,"I have eaten dinner with a man who in his youth had eaten
dinner with a man who had seen George Washington and Benjamin
Franklin talking together on the steps of Independence Hall."
Especially valuable, in connection with the problems of the world
today, is the chapter entitled, "Popular Sovereignty." It should be
mentioned that at the head of each chapter the author has placed a
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whimsical little jingle which admirably summarizes the principal idea
of the chapter. For the chapter on popular sovereignty the theme
jingle reads,
"Popular rule, as history discloses,
Depends on unity, not counting noses."
Windolph argues that popular rule means something more than majority
rule; that a democracy must be cemented together by general agreement
on matters of basic importance. One of the applications he makes of
this idea is that India (including Pakistan, apparently) could not be
governed by majority rule in view of the bitterness between Moslems
and Hindus. The minority would refuse to be bound. Conversely, in
the United States we abide by majority rule because we are united on
fundamentals, including fredom of speech, the belief that democratic
government is better than monarchy or aristocracy, that a system of
private property is better than communism, that there should be a separation of church and state, and many others. Such a fundamental as
free speech we would not submit to majority vote.
The author's greatest contribution is his insistence that there is such
a thing as right, as distinguished from wrong. True, the same contribution has been made by innumerable other thinkers, from ancient times
to the present, but that does not mean that there was no necessity for
Windolph to write what he wrote. In our day a powerful movement in
juristic thought has insisted that right and wrong are creations of the
imagination, having no reality. To this ancient contention Windolph
gives the ancient answer, that good and evil, justice and injustice, are
discernible realities. But although the answer is ancient, the brilliance
with which he elaborates it is the author's own. It is, of course, obvious that as to this basic matter the reviewer is on the author's side.
In a world where it is denied that there are any such things as right and
justice, it could hardly be expected that right and justice would be
achieved. If we are to escape the crude, raw, and bloody regime of
naked power into which the world is sinking, we must have Windolphs
to insist that right is as real as the atom bomb.
FRANK HANFT.

Professor of Law
School of Law
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, N. C.
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The Formation of the North Carolina Counties 1663-1943. By David
Leroy Corbitt. Raleigh: State Department of Archives and History,
1950. Pp. xix, 323. $0.50 (shipping charge).
This book is but one of the many valuable publications of the State
Department of Archives and History which all too frequently receive
little publicity and hence fail to attract the eye of the general reading
public. In it the author traces the formation of the counties of North
Carolina from 1663 through 1943. North Carolina has in time had one
hundred and sixteen precincts or counties. This work gives the dates
of the formation of these counties, the precincts or counties from which
they were formed, descriptions taken from legislative acts creating them
or changing their boundary lines, and surveyors' descriptions of boundary
lines when such were available.
A brief but interesting introduction sets forth the historical development of the early settlement of North Carolina; the formative stages
of its government; the provisions of the Fundamental Constitutions of
Locke which provided for separate and distinct counties and their government; the disputes that arose over the location of precinct or county
boundary lines and the erection of court houses; and the enactment- of
laws by the legislature in the attempt to settle boundary disputes.
Following this introduction the author makes a detailed study of the
formation of each of the one hundred counties of North Carolina. The
counties are studied in their alphabetical order rather than chronologically with reference to the time of their establishment. Whenever
possible the date of the formation of each county is given together with
a brief historical sketch of its formation and the derivation of its name.
Then follows a detailed description of the county lines or boundaries
along with the changes thereof which were made from time to time.
In this part of the book these descriptions were taken from the various
legislative enactments concerning county boundary lines.
In Appendix I are found detailed surveyors' descriptions of the
county boundaries. 1 The purpose of their inclusion in the appendix
is explained by the author: "I realize, of course, that the surveyors'
descriptions . ..would have been much more valuable, if I had been
able to procure all of them. Such descriptions were available only in a
few cases .. .I believe that the use of this information in the main
I The material in Appendix I consists of reports of commissioners and surveyors
who were acting under specific acts of the General Assembly or who were acting
under instructions issued by justices of the peace of the counties, who, in turn, were
authorized to determine boundary disputes by Chapter III of the Public and Private
Laws of 1836-37 of North Carolina. Today, boundary line disputes between counties are settled by the boards of county commissioners of the disputant counties, or,
if they refuse to act, by the resident judge of the district wherein the counties lie
or by the judge holding the courts of such district. See N. C. GEkr. STAT. §153-11

(1943).
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part of the book, when all descriptions were not available, would be
misleading." However, the inclusion of such material will prove most
helpful in the determination of boundary lines especially where changes
have been made.
Appendix II contains a series of charts showing the approximate
county divisions within the present state boundaries from 1700 to 1912.
Also included is a valuable chart showing the origin of North Carolina
counties, with instructions for its use in determining the origin of any
desired county. On the margin of this chart is found a list of the counties and the years in which they were formed.
This book is obviously the result of much careful study and meticulous research. If, due to lost or destroyed records, it does not contain
information concerning all boundary changes, it does contain enough
to help substantially in locating definite boundary lines. In this respect
it could help settle the occasional disputes which arise concerning the
proper county in which a citizen may vote or pay his taxes. It should
also prove of assistance to attorneys who examine titles and prepare
abstracts especially of those lands lying in the mountainous western
counties and in the swampy eastern counties where boundary lines of
particular tracts are not always definite or certain.
Already, considerable use has been made of the book not only by
schools, genealogists, historians, and county officials, but also by the
Soil Survey Division, United States Department of Agriculture, the
North Carolina Experimental Station, and the Tennessee Valley Authority. The United States Government found the book particularly
valuable when it began to abstract titles in connection with the acquisition of land for the Great Smoky Mountains National Park in western
North Carolina. This valuable study should also find a welcome place
in the library of every practicing attorney.

Fpom B. MCCALL.
Professor of Law
School of Law
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, N. C.

